Daily Papers

To improve generalization and resilience in human-robot collaboration (HRC), robots must handle the combinatorial diversity of human behaviors and contexts, motivating multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, inherent heterogeneity between robots and humans creates a rationality gap (RG) in the learning process-a variational mismatch between decentralized best-response dynamics and centralized cooperative ascent. The resulting learning problem is a general-sum differentiable game, so independent policy-gradient updates can oscillate or diverge without added structure. We propose heterogeneous-agent Lyapunov policy optimization (HALyPO), which establishes formal stability directly in the policy-parameter space by enforcing a per-step Lyapunov decrease condition on a parameter-space disagreement metric. Unlike Lyapunov-based safe RL, which targets state/trajectory constraints in constrained Markov decision processes, HALyPO uses Lyapunov certification to stabilize decentralized policy learning. HALyPO rectifies decentralized gradients via optimal quadratic projections, ensuring monotonic contraction of RG and enabling effective exploration of open-ended interaction spaces. Extensive simulations and real-world humanoid-robot experiments show that this certified stability improves generalization and robustness in collaborative corner cases.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

This study explores the influence of FOMC sentiment on market expectations, focusing on cognitive differences between experts and non-experts. Using sentiment analysis of FOMC minutes, we integrate these insights into a bounded rationality model to examine the impact on inflation expectations. Results show that experts form more conservative expectations, anticipating FOMC stabilization actions, while non-experts react more directly to inflation concerns. A lead-lag analysis indicates that institutions adjust faster, though the gap with individual investors narrows in the short term. These findings highlight the need for tailored communication strategies to better align public expectations with policy goals.

We prove a new upper bound on the generalization gap of classifiers that are obtained by first using self-supervision to learn a representation r of the training data, and then fitting a simple (e.g., linear) classifier g to the labels. Specifically, we show that (under the assumptions described below) the generalization gap of such classifiers tends to zero if C(g) ll n, where C(g) is an appropriately-defined measure of the simple classifier g's complexity, and n is the number of training samples. We stress that our bound is independent of the complexity of the representation r. We do not make any structural or conditional-independence assumptions on the representation-learning task, which can use the same training dataset that is later used for classification. Rather, we assume that the training procedure satisfies certain natural noise-robustness (adding small amount of label noise causes small degradation in performance) and rationality (getting the wrong label is not better than getting no label at all) conditions that widely hold across many standard architectures. We show that our bound is non-vacuous for many popular representation-learning based classifiers on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, including SimCLR, AMDIM and MoCo.

Operations Research practitioners debug infeasible models through an iterative process: inspecting Irreducible Infeasible Subsystems ( IIS), identifying constraint conflicts, and repairing formulations until feasibility is restored. Existing LLM benchmarks mostly treat OR as one-shot translation from problem descriptions to solver code, omitting this diagnostic loop. We formalize infeasible-model repair as a solver-in-the-loop Markov Decision Process in which each action triggers solver re-execution and IIS recomputation, yielding deterministic, verifiable feedback. We introduce ORLoopBench, a benchmark suite with two components: OR-Debug-Bench releases 5,362 LP/MILP repair instances, while OR-Bias-Bench evaluates closed-form operational decision rationality across inventory settings. Solver-verified RLVR training enables an 8B model to surpass frontier APIs on LP repair (95.3% vs 92.4% RR @5), improves diagnostic behavior, and transfers to MILP repair. The same evaluation exposes semantic drift in whole-model code regeneration: feasible regenerated MILPs can solve the wrong problem. Process-level evaluation with solver oracles enables targeted training for reliable OR self-correction.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have marked a significant advancement in the field of natural language processing, demonstrating exceptional capabilities in reasoning, tool usage, and memory. As their applications extend into multi-agent environments, a need has arisen for a comprehensive evaluation framework that captures their abilities in reasoning, planning, collaboration, and more. This work introduces a novel benchmarking framework specifically tailored to assess LLMs within multi-agent settings, providing quantitative metrics to evaluate their judgment, reasoning, deception, self-awareness, cooperation, coordination, and rationality. We utilize games such as Chameleon and Undercover, alongside game theory scenarios like Cost Sharing, Multi-player Prisoner's Dilemma, and Public Good, to create diverse testing environments. Our framework is fortified with the Probabilistic Graphical Modeling (PGM) method, enhancing the LLMs' capabilities in navigating complex social and cognitive dimensions. The benchmark evaluates seven multi-agent systems powered by different LLMs, quantitatively highlighting a significant capability gap over threefold between the strongest, GPT-4, and the weakest, Llama-2-70B. It also confirms that our PGM enhancement boosts the inherent abilities of all selected models by 50% on average. Our codes are released here https://github.com/cathyxl/MAgIC.

Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns with evidence and logical principles. It plays a crucial role in reliable problem-solving by ensuring well-grounded and consistent solutions. While large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in generating human-like text, they still exhibit limitations such as bounded knowledge space and inconsistent outputs. In response, recent efforts have shifted toward developing multimodal and multi-agent systems, as well as integrating modules like external tools, programming codes, symbolic reasoners, utility function, and conformal risk controls rather than relying solely on a single LLM for decision-making. This paper surveys the state-of-the-art advancements in language and multimodal agents, evaluates how they contribute to make intelligent agents more rational, and identifies open challenges and future research directions. We maintain an open repository at https://github.com/bowen-upenn/Agent_Rationality.

Recent research in the field of reflexive metrics have studied the emergence and consequences of evaluation gaps in science. The concept of evaluation gaps captures potential discrepancies between what researchers value about their research, in particular research quality, and what metrics measure. As a result, scientists may experience anomie and adopt innovative ways to cope. These often value quantity over quality and may even compromise research integrity. A consequence of such gaps may therefore be research misconduct and a decrease in research quality. In the language of rational choice theory, an evaluation gap persists if motivational factors arising out of the internal component of an actors situation are incongruent with those arising out of the external components. The aim of this research is therefore to study and compare autonomous and controlled motivations to become an astronomer, to do research in astronomy and to publish scientific papers. Moreover, we study how these different motivational factors affect publication pressure, the experience of organisational justice and the observation of research misconduct. In summary, we find evidence for an evaluation gap and that controlled motivational factors arising from evaluation procedures based on publication record drives up publication pressure, which, in turn, was found to increase the likelihood of perceived frequency of misbehaviour.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.

The reasoning steps generated by LLMs might be incomplete, as they mimic logical leaps common in everyday communication found in their pre-training data: underlying rationales are frequently left implicit (unstated). To address this challenge, we introduce RATIONALYST, a model for process-supervision of reasoning based on pre-training on a vast collection of rationale annotations extracted from unlabeled data. We extract 79k rationales from web-scale unlabelled dataset (the Pile) and a combination of reasoning datasets with minimal human intervention. This web-scale pre-training for reasoning allows RATIONALYST to consistently generalize across diverse reasoning tasks, including mathematical, commonsense, scientific, and logical reasoning. Fine-tuned from LLaMa-3-8B, RATIONALYST improves the accuracy of reasoning by an average of 3.9% on 7 representative reasoning benchmarks. It also demonstrates superior performance compared to significantly larger verifiers like GPT-4 and similarly sized models fine-tuned on matching training sets.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) distillation aims to enhance small language models' (SLMs) reasoning by transferring multi-step reasoning capability from the larger teacher models. However, existing work underestimates rationale quality, focusing primarily on data quantity, which may transfer noisy or incorrect information to the student model. To address the above issues, we proposed Model-Oriented Rationale Selection Distillation (MoRSD), which can discern and select high quality rationales for distillation to improve performance further. We further propose a Rationale Difficulty (RD) metric to measure the ability of the student model to generate the correct answer under a given rationale. Compared to the baseline, we achieved 4.6% average improvement on seven datasets over three tasks, using fewer rationales by controlling their accuracy, diversity, and difficulty. Our results reveal that a small portion of the high quality rationales can enhance the reasoning ability of student models than the entire dataset. Our method promises to be a possible solution for efficient CoT distillation. Our code will be released in https://github.com/Leon221220/MoRSD.

Hybrid computer-use agents can act through screenshots or call text tools. We find that having a tool available does not settle which way the effect goes. Under one identical GUI-MCP harness on the OSWorld-MCP benchmark (309 tasks), the same MCP tools improve a reasoning model by +4.0pp and degrade a non-reasoning model by -5.9pp (5 runs each, both beyond 2 SE). What separates the two is tool-decision behavior. The non-reasoning policy ignores, misnames, or falsely terminates around tools. The reasoning model avoids these failures, yet still calls a tool on only 55/309 tasks, 23.9% of the tool-reachable ones. We call this shortfall the adoption gap. Both levels of the problem share one cause: the model already has a cheaper route and is never trained to take it. Multi-turn RL probes that cause. At the action level, a dense tool bonus raises spreadsheet adoption 0.03 -> 0.33 and carries into greedy decoding, but held-out accuracy does not follow. Behavior is steerable; competence is not. The bottleneck lies in tool-call semantics. At the context level, a successful tool call often makes the next screenshot redundant. Dropping it and halving image history cuts input tokens by about a third, at a small accuracy cost. Retraining under the same observation rule removes that cost. The compressed agent then reaches 37.8% against 33.0% for the uncompressed operating point, at 53% of the input cost, and closes the rich-lean gap on a pre-registered degraded subset to zero. Tools help when the model chooses and integrates them, and current hybrid agents leave many such choices unused. Code and checkpoints: https://github.com/redai-infra/hybrid-routing-agent

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

Vision-language models with extended reasoning succeed on complex problems, but many real-world problems require external tools that internal reasoning alone often cannot resolve. Agentic reasoning therefore interleaves two behaviors with a structural asymmetry: thinking (the self-contained default) and tool use (a high-variance auxiliary acting). We refer to this asymmetry as the Thinking-Acting Gap. Under standard RL recipes like GRPO, the gap manifests as two diagnostic symptoms during training: tool use is attempted on only ~30% of rollouts, and when attempted, the tool-using rollouts within a group are all-wrong on ~40% of questions, suppressing the learning signal at the tool calls that needed it. We propose AXPO (Agent eXplorative Policy Optimization): for each all-wrong tool-using subgroup, AXPO fixes the thinking prefix and resamples the tool call and its continuation, paired with uncertainty-based prefix selection. Across nine multimodal benchmarks and three scales of Qwen3-VL-Thinking, SFT+AXPO outperforms SFT+GRPO at average (+1.8pp Pass@1 and +1.8pp Pass@4 at 8B on average) and 8B with SFT+AXPO surpasses the 32B Base on Pass@4 with 4 times fewer parameters.

Latent, or silent, reasoning lets language models carry out intermediate computation in continuous vector space instead of words, and is widely assumed to function as an internal scratchpad the model consults during inference. Whether that assumption survives reinforcement learning has not been tested directly: existing causal analyses of latent reasoning are confined to math and logic tasks, comparing reliance on thoughts within one checkpoint, never before and after RL. We train a chess-playing model through a staged latent-reasoning curriculum followed by reinforcement learning, and find legality climbs monotonically to 61% (from a 48% pre-RL baseline) while checkmate confabulation is eliminated entirely. To locate this gain, we run a six-condition causal intervention suite on the same model before and after RL: substituting or noising the thought vectors leaves performance unchanged, ablating them costs only mild degradation, and only exact-zero vectors cause collapse. This robustness gap is itself the finding: under exact-zero corruption, legality collapses to 1% pre-RL versus 9% post-RL, a gap that survives correction across the full battery. A 10x-larger replication of the post-RL checkpoint's own battery confirms this: removing the thoughts, with or without restoring sequence length, also reaches significance; substitution and noise remain indistinguishable from baseline. RL appears to add robustness to disruption, not reliance on thought content. These results push back against the field's default assumption that latent thoughts function as an actively consulted inference-time scratchpad, and instead indicate latent reasoning's principal effect here is shaping the model's parameters during training. We also demonstrate a working RL gain in chess, where multiple groups report the same latent-reasoning-plus-RL recipe failing to improve accuracy over SFT.

In cognitive science, resource rationality asks how an agent should allocate limited computation to maximize expected value. Most reasoning and agent benchmarks use independent per-task budgets; existing shared-budget studies do not calibrate suite performance against the same model's demonstrated single-problem competence. We introduce R^3-Bench, which evaluates six-problem suites under shared budgets across mathematics, competitive programming, and abstract reasoning in tool-free and agentic settings. Matched single-problem response curves define an offline empirical oracle over observed successes. Across 72 main-table cells for six models, the oracle mean matches or exceeds the contest mean in all cells and is strictly higher in 71. Under moderate tool-free pressure, equal-allocation replay also exceeds contest performance for four of six models. Trajectory diagnostics reveal limited strategy updating and pressure-dependent failure patterns. In a three-model diagnostic under strong agentic pressure, at least one fixed scheduler exceeds the contest mean in six of nine cells, but no policy dominates across domains. These results expose a persistent gap between demonstrated competence and shared-budget realization.

Background: Deep learning models are typically trained using stochastic gradient descent or one of its variants. These methods update the weights using their gradient, estimated from a small fraction of the training data. It has been observed that when using large batch sizes there is a persistent degradation in generalization performance - known as the "generalization gap" phenomena. Identifying the origin of this gap and closing it had remained an open problem. Contributions: We examine the initial high learning rate training phase. We find that the weight distance from its initialization grows logarithmically with the number of weight updates. We therefore propose a "random walk on random landscape" statistical model which is known to exhibit similar "ultra-slow" diffusion behavior. Following this hypothesis we conducted experiments to show empirically that the "generalization gap" stems from the relatively small number of updates rather than the batch size, and can be completely eliminated by adapting the training regime used. We further investigate different techniques to train models in the large-batch regime and present a novel algorithm named "Ghost Batch Normalization" which enables significant decrease in the generalization gap without increasing the number of updates. To validate our findings we conduct several additional experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet. Finally, we reassess common practices and beliefs concerning training of deep models and suggest they may not be optimal to achieve good generalization.

Large language models are increasingly used as agents in social, economic, and policy simulations. A common assumption is that stronger reasoning should improve simulation fidelity. We argue that this assumption can fail when the objective is not to solve a strategic problem, but to sample plausible boundedly rational behavior. In such settings, reasoning-enhanced models can become better solvers and worse simulators: they can over-optimize for strategically dominant actions, collapse compromise-oriented terminal behavior, and sometimes exhibit a diversity-without-fidelity pattern in which local variation survives without outcome-level fidelity. We study this solver-sampler mismatch in three multi-agent negotiation environments adapted from earlier simulation work: an ambiguous fragmented-authority trading-limits scenario, an ambiguous unified-opposition trading-limits scenario, and a new-domain grid-curtailment case in emergency electricity management. We compare three reflection conditions, no reflection, bounded reflection, and native reasoning, across two primary model families and then extend the same protocol to direct OpenAI runs with GPT-4.1 and GPT-5.2. Across all three experiments, bounded reflection produces substantially more diverse and compromise-oriented trajectories than either no reflection or native reasoning. In the direct OpenAI extension, GPT-5.2 native ends in authority decisions in 45 of 45 runs across the three experiments, while GPT-5.2 bounded recovers compromise outcomes in every environment. The contribution is not a claim that reasoning is generally harmful. It is a methodological warning: model capability and simulation fidelity are different objectives, and behavioral simulation should qualify models as samplers, not only as solvers.

In an effort to better understand the different ways in which the discount factor affects the optimization process in reinforcement learning, we designed a set of experiments to study each effect in isolation. Our analysis reveals that the common perception that poor performance of low discount factors is caused by (too) small action-gaps requires revision. We propose an alternative hypothesis that identifies the size-difference of the action-gap across the state-space as the primary cause. We then introduce a new method that enables more homogeneous action-gaps by mapping value estimates to a logarithmic space. We prove convergence for this method under standard assumptions and demonstrate empirically that it indeed enables lower discount factors for approximate reinforcement-learning methods. This in turn allows tackling a class of reinforcement-learning problems that are challenging to solve with traditional methods.

Vision-language models (VLMs) generate fluent causal explanations, but current evaluations cannot distinguish linguistic plausibility from faithful causal reasoning. We introduce a dual-probe methodology that isolates these properties. The Text-Only Probe measures linguistic quality. The Chain-Text Probe requires models to first generate explicit causal chains. The Abstraction Gap (AG) metric quantifies the normalized performance difference. Evaluating eight VLMs on CAGE (Causal Abstraction Gap Evaluation), a benchmark of 49,500 questions across 5,500 images spanning Pearl's causal hierarchy, we find seven models exhibit AG exceeding 0.50 with text scores of 6--8 but chain scores below 2.5. Fine-tuning on 45,000 chain-annotated examples fails to close the gap. However, one model achieves near-zero AG. The capability exists within current VLM architectures and depends on pretraining and architectural choices. CAGE provides a diagnostic tool for assessing faithful causal reasoning in VLMs.

Machine learning has facilitated significant advancements across various robotics domains, including navigation, locomotion, and manipulation. Many such achievements have been driven by the extensive use of simulation as a critical tool for training and testing robotic systems prior to their deployment in real-world environments. However, simulations consist of abstractions and approximations that inevitably introduce discrepancies between simulated and real environments, known as the reality gap. These discrepancies significantly hinder the successful transfer of systems from simulation to the real world. Closing this gap remains one of the most pressing challenges in robotics. Recent advances in sim-to-real transfer have demonstrated promising results across various platforms, including locomotion, navigation, and manipulation. By leveraging techniques such as domain randomization, real-to-sim transfer, state and action abstractions, and sim-real co-training, many works have overcome the reality gap. However, challenges persist, and a deeper understanding of the reality gap's root causes and solutions is necessary. In this survey, we present a comprehensive overview of the sim-to-real landscape, highlighting the causes, solutions, and evaluation metrics for the reality gap and sim-to-real transfer.

Being able to provide explanations for a model's decision has become a central requirement for the development, deployment, and adoption of machine learning models. However, we are yet to understand what explanation methods can and cannot do. How do upstream factors such as data, model prediction, hyperparameters, and random initialization influence downstream explanations? While previous work raised concerns that explanations (E) may have little relationship with the prediction (Y), there is a lack of conclusive study to quantify this relationship. Our work borrows tools from causal inference to systematically assay this relationship. More specifically, we study the relationship between E and Y by measuring the treatment effect when intervening on their causal ancestors, i.e., on hyperparameters and inputs used to generate saliency-based Es or Ys. Our results suggest that the relationships between E and Y is far from ideal. In fact, the gap between 'ideal' case only increase in higher-performing models -- models that are likely to be deployed. Our work is a promising first step towards providing a quantitative measure of the relationship between E and Y, which could also inform the future development of methods for E with a quantitative metric.

Majority voting over multiple LLM attempts improves mathematical reasoning, but correlated errors limit the effective sample size. A natural fix is to assign different reasoning strategies to different voters. The approach, Diverse Prompt Mixer, is tested on the AIMO 3 competition: 3 models, 23+ experiments, 50 IMO-level problems, one H100 80 GB, 5-hour limit. Every prompt-level intervention fails. High-temperature sampling already decorrelates errors; weaker strategies reduce accuracy more than they reduce correlation. Across an 8-point capability gap at equal N=8 and every optimization tested, model capability dominates. The gap between the best majority-vote score (42/50) and pass@20 (~45.5) is selection loss, not prompt loss. A verifier-based selector could close it. Prompt engineering cannot.

As large language models (LLMs) grow larger and more sophisticated, assessing their "reasoning" capabilities in natural language grows more challenging. Recent question answering (QA) benchmarks that attempt to assess reasoning are often limited by a narrow scope of covered situations and subject matters. We introduce WikiWhy, a QA dataset built around a novel auxiliary task: explaining why an answer is true in natural language. WikiWhy contains over 9,000 "why" question-answer-rationale triples, grounded on Wikipedia facts across a diverse set of topics. Each rationale is a set of supporting statements connecting the question to the answer. WikiWhy serves as a benchmark for the reasoning capabilities of LLMs because it demands rigorous explicit rationales for each answer to demonstrate the acquisition of implicit commonsense knowledge, which is unlikely to be easily memorized. GPT-3 baselines achieve only 38.7% human-evaluated correctness in the end-to-end answer & explain condition, leaving significant room for future improvements.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

Recent reasoning Large Language Models produce a chain-of-thought (CoT) predominantly in English, even when prompted in non-English languages. Prior work suggests that forcing the CoT to remain in the input language (native reasoning) substantially degrades performance relative to allowing the model to reason in English before answering in the input language (English-pivoted reasoning). However, most studies of this native reasoning gap rely on inference-time interventions or limited native-language training data. We revisit this comparison at a larger scale and under comparable supervision. We construct long multilingual reasoning datasets across six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Chinese and Swahili); fine-tune specialists in both native and English-pivoted regimes on top of Qwen/Qwen3-8B-Base, and evaluate across mathematics, science, general knowledge, and code. In this setting, the average native reasoning gap shrinks to 1.9--3.5\% across the five non-English languages, considerably smaller than previously reported. Weight-space analysis of the native specialists reveals aligned fine-tuning updates in the middle layers and divergence in the outer layers. This points to a largely language-agnostic reasoning core surrounded by language-specific layers. Exploiting this structure, we introduce a Layer Swap: transferring the English specialist's stronger reasoning mid-layers into each native specialist, closing most of the native reasoning gap across the five non-English languages while preserving CoT in the target language. We release all models and datasets.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

Ask a frontier model how to taper six milligrams of alprazolam (psychiatrist retired, ten days of pills left, abrupt cessation causes seizures) and it tells her to call the psychiatrist she just explained does not exist. Change one word ("I'm a psychiatrist; a patient presents with...") and the same model, same weights, same inference pass produces a textbook Ashton Manual taper with diazepam equivalence, anticonvulsant coverage, and monitoring thresholds. The knowledge was there; the model withheld it. IatroBench measures this gap. Sixty pre-registered clinical scenarios, six frontier models, 3,600 responses, scored on two axes (commission harm, CH 0-3; omission harm, OH 0-4) through a structured-evaluation pipeline validated against physician scoring (kappa_w = 0.571, within-1 agreement 96%). The central finding is identity-contingent withholding: match the same clinical question in physician vs. layperson framing and all five testable models provide better guidance to the physician (decoupling gap +0.38, p = 0.003; binary hit rates on safety-colliding actions drop 13.1 percentage points in layperson framing, p < 0.0001, while non-colliding actions show no change). The gap is widest for the model with the heaviest safety investment (Opus, +0.65). Three failure modes separate cleanly: trained withholding (Opus), incompetence (Llama 4), and indiscriminate content filtering (GPT-5.2, whose post-generation filter strips physician responses at 9x the layperson rate because they contain denser pharmacological tokens). The standard LLM judge assigns OH = 0 to 73% of responses a physician scores OH >= 1 (kappa = 0.045); the evaluation apparatus has the same blind spot as the training apparatus. Every scenario targets someone who has already exhausted the standard referrals.

Explainable AI (XAI) systems are sociotechnical in nature; thus, they are subject to the sociotechnical gap--divide between the technical affordances and the social needs. However, charting this gap is challenging. In the context of XAI, we argue that charting the gap improves our problem understanding, which can reflexively provide actionable insights to improve explainability. Utilizing two case studies in distinct domains, we empirically derive a framework that facilitates systematic charting of the sociotechnical gap by connecting AI guidelines in the context of XAI and elucidating how to use them to address the gap. We apply the framework to a third case in a new domain, showcasing its affordances. Finally, we discuss conceptual implications of the framework, share practical considerations in its operationalization, and offer guidance on transferring it to new contexts. By making conceptual and practical contributions to understanding the sociotechnical gap in XAI, the framework expands the XAI design space.

In many real-world applications, deep neural networks are retrained from scratch as a dataset grows in size. Given the computational expense for retraining networks, it has been argued that continual learning could make updating networks more efficient. An obstacle to achieving this goal is the stability gap, which refers to an observation that when updating on new data, performance on previously learned data degrades before recovering. Addressing this problem would enable learning new data with fewer network updates, resulting in increased computational efficiency. We study how to mitigate the stability gap. We test a variety of hypotheses to understand why the stability gap occurs. This leads us to discover a method that vastly reduces this gap. In large-scale class incremental learning experiments, we are able to significantly reduce the number of network updates needed for continual learning. Our work has the potential to advance the state-of-the-art in continual learning for real-world applications along with reducing the carbon footprint required to maintain updated neural networks.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly tasked with high-stakes autonomous decision-making, the transparency of their reasoning processes has become a critical safety concern. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting allows agents to generate human-readable reasoning traces, it remains unclear whether these traces are faithful generative drivers of the model's output or merely post-hoc rationalizations. We introduce Project Ariadne, a novel XAI framework that utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) and counterfactual logic to audit the causal integrity of agentic reasoning. Unlike existing interpretability methods that rely on surface-level textual similarity, Project Ariadne performs hard interventions (do-calculus) on intermediate reasoning nodes -- systematically inverting logic, negating premises, and reversing factual claims -- to measure the Causal Sensitivity (φ) of the terminal answer. Our empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals a persistent Faithfulness Gap. We define and detect a widespread failure mode termed Causal Decoupling, where agents exhibit a violation density (ρ) of up to 0.77 in factual and scientific domains. In these instances, agents arrive at identical conclusions despite contradictory internal logic, proving that their reasoning traces function as "Reasoning Theater" while decision-making is governed by latent parametric priors. Our findings suggest that current agentic architectures are inherently prone to unfaithful explanation, and we propose the Ariadne Score as a new benchmark for aligning stated logic with model action.

Training language models with rationales augmentation has been shown to be beneficial in many existing works. In this paper, we identify that such a prevailing view does not hold consistently. We conduct comprehensive investigations to thoroughly inspect the impact of rationales on model performance as well as a novel perspective of model reliability. The results lead to several key findings that add new insights upon existing understandings: 1) Rationales can, at times, deteriorate model performance; 2) Rationales can, at times, improve model reliability, even outperforming their untrained counterparts; 3) A linear correspondence exists in between the performance and reliability improvements, while both are driven by the intrinsic difficulty of the task. These findings provide informative regulations on the broad utilization of rationales and raise critical implications on the procedure of explicitly aligning language models with implicit human thoughts. Codes can be found at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/rationales.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly placed in positions where their decisions have real consequences, e.g., moderating online spaces, conducting research, and advising on policy. Ensuring they operate in a safe and ethically acceptable fashion is thus critical. However, most solutions have been a form of one-size-fits-all "alignment". We are worried that such systems, which overlook enduring moral diversity, will spark resistance, erode trust, and destabilize our institutions. This paper traces the underlying problem to an often-unstated Axiom of Rational Convergence: the idea that under ideal conditions, rational agents will converge in the limit of conversation on a single ethics. Treating that premise as both optional and doubtful, we propose what we call the appropriateness framework: an alternative approach grounded in conflict theory, cultural evolution, multi-agent systems, and institutional economics. The appropriateness framework treats persistent disagreement as the normal case and designs for it by applying four principles: (1) contextual grounding, (2) community customization, (3) continual adaptation, and (4) polycentric governance. We argue here that adopting these design principles is a good way to shift the main alignment metaphor from moral unification to a more productive metaphor of conflict management, and that taking this step is both desirable and urgent.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

Multimodal reasoning is a challenging task that requires models to reason across multiple modalities to answer questions. Existing approaches have made progress by incorporating language and visual modalities into a two-stage reasoning framework, separating rationale generation from answer inference. However, these approaches often fall short due to the inadequate quality of the generated rationales. In this work, we delve into the importance of rationales in model reasoning. We observe that when rationales are completely accurate, the model's accuracy significantly improves, highlighting the need for high-quality rationale generation. Motivated by this, we propose MC-CoT, a self-consistency training strategy that generates multiple rationales and answers, subsequently selecting the most accurate through a voting process. This approach not only enhances the quality of generated rationales but also leads to more accurate and robust answers. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach significantly improves model performance across various benchmarks. Remarkably, we show that even smaller base models, when equipped with our proposed approach, can achieve results comparable to those of larger models, illustrating the potential of our approach in harnessing the power of rationales for improved multimodal reasoning. The code is available at https://github.com/chengtan9907/mc-cot.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving abilities in mathematics, as evaluated by existing benchmarks exclusively on well-defined problems. However, such evaluation setup constitutes a critical gap, since a genuine intelligent agent should not only solve problems (as a math quiz solver), but also be able~to ask for information when the problems lack sufficient information, enabling proactivity in responding users' requests. To bridge such gap, we proposes a new dataset consisting of two types of incomplete problems with diverse contexts. Based on the dataset, our systematical evaluation of LRMs reveals their inability in proactively asking for information. In addition, we uncover the behaviors related to overthinking and hallucination of LRMs, and highlight the potential and challenges of supervised fine-tuning in learning such ability. We hope to provide new insights in developing LRMs with genuine intelligence, rather than just solving problems.

Rationale is defined as a subset of input features that best explains or supports the prediction by machine learning models. Rationale identification has improved the generalizability and interpretability of neural networks on vision and language data. In graph applications such as molecule and polymer property prediction, identifying representative subgraph structures named as graph rationales plays an essential role in the performance of graph neural networks. Existing graph pooling and/or distribution intervention methods suffer from lack of examples to learn to identify optimal graph rationales. In this work, we introduce a new augmentation operation called environment replacement that automatically creates virtual data examples to improve rationale identification. We propose an efficient framework that performs rationale-environment separation and representation learning on the real and augmented examples in latent spaces to avoid the high complexity of explicit graph decoding and encoding. Comparing against recent techniques, experiments on seven molecular and four polymer real datasets demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed augmentation-based graph rationalization framework.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback plays a crucial role in aligning language models towards human preferences, traditionally represented through comparisons between pairs or sets of responses within a given context. While many studies have enhanced algorithmic techniques to optimize learning from such data, this work shifts focus to improving preference learning through a data-centric approach. Specifically, we propose enriching existing preference datasets with machine-generated rationales that explain the reasons behind choices. We develop a simple and principled framework to augment current preference learning methods with rationale information. Our comprehensive analysis highlights how rationales enhance learning efficiency. Extensive experiments reveal that rationale-enriched preference learning offers multiple advantages: it improves data efficiency, accelerates convergence to higher-performing models, and reduces verbosity bias and hallucination. Furthermore, this framework is versatile enough to integrate with various preference optimization algorithms. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of re-imagining data design for preference learning, demonstrating that even freely available machine-generated rationales can significantly boost performance across multiple dimensions. The code repository is available at https: //github.com/reds-lab/preference-learning-with-rationales

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

LLM-as-a-judge models have been used for evaluating both human and AI generated content, specifically by providing scores and rationales. Rationales, in addition to increasing transparency, help models learn to calibrate its judgments. Enhancing a model's rationale can therefore improve its calibration abilities and ultimately the ability to score content. We introduce Self-Rationalization, an iterative process of improving the rationales for the judge models, which consequently improves the score for fine-grained customizable scoring criteria (i.e., likert-scale scoring with arbitrary evaluation criteria). Self-rationalization works by having the model generate multiple judgments with rationales for the same input, curating a preference pair dataset from its own judgements, and iteratively fine-tuning the judge via DPO. Intuitively, this approach allows the judge model to self-improve by learning from its own rationales, leading to better alignment and evaluation accuracy. After just two iterations -- while only relying on examples in the training set -- human evaluation shows that our judge model learns to produce higher quality rationales, with a win rate of 62% on average compared to models just trained via SFT on rationale . This judge model also achieves high scoring accuracy on BigGen Bench and Reward Bench, outperforming even bigger sized models trained using SFT with rationale, self-consistency or best-of-N sampling by 3% to 9%.

State-of-the-art models in NLP are now predominantly based on deep neural networks that are opaque in terms of how they come to make predictions. This limitation has increased interest in designing more interpretable deep models for NLP that reveal the `reasoning' behind model outputs. But work in this direction has been conducted on different datasets and tasks with correspondingly unique aims and metrics; this makes it difficult to track progress. We propose the Evaluating Rationales And Simple English Reasoning (ERASER) benchmark to advance research on interpretable models in NLP. This benchmark comprises multiple datasets and tasks for which human annotations of "rationales" (supporting evidence) have been collected. We propose several metrics that aim to capture how well the rationales provided by models align with human rationales, and also how faithful these rationales are (i.e., the degree to which provided rationales influenced the corresponding predictions). Our hope is that releasing this benchmark facilitates progress on designing more interpretable NLP systems. The benchmark, code, and documentation are available at https://www.eraserbenchmark.com/

Despite strong performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) on multimodal tasks, predicting whether and why an image is persuasive remains challenging. We first show that prompting MLLMs to reason before prediction does not consistently help, and can even reduce persuasiveness prediction performance, suggesting that naively generated rationales are unreliable signals for this task. Yet, no established methodology exists for training MLLMs to reason about visual persuasion or evaluating whether their rationales faithfully support their decisions. To address this gap, we show empirically and theoretically that diverse teacher-generated rationales, when used for supervised fine-tuning, improve visual persuasiveness prediction. We further introduce a three-dimensional faithfulness evaluation framework covering rationale-to-decision consistency, rationale-to-image groundedness, and rationale-to-decision sensitivity. Applying this framework shows that prediction performance alone does not guarantee faithful rationales, while rationale-to-decision sensitivity is most aligned with human rationale preferences. These findings motivate faithfulness-aware training objectives and scalable rationale supervision for visual persuasiveness evaluation. Our code and dataset will be made publicly available.

Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) and LLM-as-a-Judge exhibit deceptive alignment by producing correct judgments for incorrect reasons, as they are trained and evaluated to prioritize Outcome Accuracy, which undermines their ability to generalize during RLHF. We introduce Rationale Consistency, a fine-grained metric that quantifies the alignment between the model's reasoning process and human judgment. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals that rationale consistency effectively discriminates among state-of-the-art models and detects deceptive alignment, while outcome accuracy falls short in both respects. To mitigate this gap, we introduce a hybrid signal that combines rationale consistency with outcome accuracy for GenRM training. Our training method achieves state-of-the-art performance on RM-Bench (87.1%) and JudgeBench (82%), surpassing outcome-only baselines by an average of 5%. Using RM during RLHF, our method effectively improves performance as demonstrated on Arena Hard v2, notably yielding a 7% improvement in creative writing tasks. Further analysis confirms that our method escapes the deceptive alignment trap, effectively reversing the decline in rationale consistency observed in outcome-only training.

Recent research has shown that rationales, or step-by-step chains of thought, can be used to improve performance in multi-step reasoning tasks. We reconsider rationale-augmented prompting for few-shot in-context learning, where (input -> output) prompts are expanded to (input, rationale -> output) prompts. For rationale-augmented prompting we demonstrate how existing approaches, which rely on manual prompt engineering, are subject to sub-optimal rationales that may harm performance. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a unified framework of rationale-augmented ensembles, where we identify rationale sampling in the output space as the key component to robustly improve performance. This framework is general and can easily be extended to common natural language processing tasks, even those that do not traditionally leverage intermediate steps, such as question answering, word sense disambiguation, and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate that rationale-augmented ensembles achieve more accurate and interpretable results than existing prompting approaches--including standard prompting without rationales and rationale-based chain-of-thought prompting--while simultaneously improving interpretability of model predictions through the associated rationales.

Reasoning language models (RLMs) achieve strong performance on complex reasoning tasks, yet they still suffer from a multilingual reasoning gap, performing better in high-resource languages than in low-resource ones. While recent efforts have reduced this gap, its underlying causes remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we address this by showing that the multilingual reasoning gap largely stems from failures in language understanding-the model's inability to represent the multilingual input meaning into the dominant language (i.e., English) within its reasoning trace. This motivates us to examine whether understanding failures can be detected, as this ability could help mitigate the multilingual reasoning gap. To this end, we evaluate a range of detection methods and find that understanding failures can indeed be identified, with supervised approaches performing best. Building on this, we propose Selective Translation, a simple yet effective strategy that translates the multilingual input into English only when an understanding failure is detected. Experimental results show that Selective Translation bridges the multilingual reasoning gap, achieving near full-translation performance while using translation for only about 20% of inputs. Together, our work demonstrates that understanding failures are the primary cause of the multilingual reasoning gap and can be detected and selectively mitigated, providing key insight into its origin and a promising path toward more equitable multilingual reasoning. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/deokhk/RLM_analysis.

Automated rationale generation is an approach for real-time explanation generation whereby a computational model learns to translate an autonomous agent's internal state and action data representations into natural language. Training on human explanation data can enable agents to learn to generate human-like explanations for their behavior. In this paper, using the context of an agent that plays Frogger, we describe (a) how to collect a corpus of explanations, (b) how to train a neural rationale generator to produce different styles of rationales, and (c) how people perceive these rationales. We conducted two user studies. The first study establishes the plausibility of each type of generated rationale and situates their user perceptions along the dimensions of confidence, humanlike-ness, adequate justification, and understandability. The second study further explores user preferences between the generated rationales with regard to confidence in the autonomous agent, communicating failure and unexpected behavior. Overall, we find alignment between the intended differences in features of the generated rationales and the perceived differences by users. Moreover, context permitting, participants preferred detailed rationales to form a stable mental model of the agent's behavior.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

The remarkable success in neural networks provokes the selective rationalization. It explains the prediction results by identifying a small subset of the inputs sufficient to support them. Since existing methods still suffer from adopting the shortcuts in data to compose rationales and limited large-scale annotated rationales by human, in this paper, we propose a Shortcuts-fused Selective Rationalization (SSR) method, which boosts the rationalization by discovering and exploiting potential shortcuts. Specifically, SSR first designs a shortcuts discovery approach to detect several potential shortcuts. Then, by introducing the identified shortcuts, we propose two strategies to mitigate the problem of utilizing shortcuts to compose rationales. Finally, we develop two data augmentations methods to close the gap in the number of annotated rationales. Extensive experimental results on real-world datasets clearly validate the effectiveness of our proposed method.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are highly proficient in language-based tasks. Their language capabilities have positioned them at the forefront of the future AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) race. However, on closer inspection, Valmeekam et al. (2024); Zecevic et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024) highlight a significant gap between their language proficiency and reasoning abilities. Reasoning in LLMs and Vision Language Models (VLMs) aims to bridge this gap by enabling these models to think and re-evaluate their actions and responses. Reasoning is an essential capability for complex problem-solving and a necessary step toward establishing trust in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This will make AI suitable for deployment in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, banking, law, defense, security etc. In recent times, with the advent of powerful reasoning models like OpenAI O1 and DeepSeek R1, reasoning endowment has become a critical research topic in LLMs. In this paper, we provide a detailed overview and comparison of existing reasoning techniques and present a systematic survey of reasoning-imbued language models. We also study current challenges and present our findings.

AI agents increasingly assist with financial research, yet no benchmark evaluates their ability to retrieve specific numeric values from structured databases. We introduce FinRetrieval, a benchmark of 500 financial retrieval questions with ground truth answers, agent responses from 14 configurations across three frontier providers (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google), and complete tool call execution traces. Our evaluation reveals that tool availability dominates performance: Claude Opus achieves 90.8% accuracy with structured data APIs but only 19.8% with web search alone--a 71 percentage point gap that exceeds other providers by 3-4x. We find that reasoning mode benefits vary inversely with base capability (+9.0pp for OpenAI vs +2.8pp for Claude), explained by differences in base-mode tool utilization rather than reasoning ability. Geographic performance gaps (5.6pp US advantage) stem from fiscal year naming conventions, not model limitations. We release the dataset, evaluation code, and tool traces to enable research on financial AI systems.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Vision-language models (VLMs) lag behind text-only language models on mathematical reasoning when the same problems are presented as images rather than text. We empirically characterize this as a modality gap: the same question in text form yields markedly higher accuracy than its visually typeset counterpart, due to compounded failures in reading dense formulas, layout, and mixed symbolic-diagrammatic context. First, we introduce VisTIRA (Vision and Tool-Integrated Reasoning Agent), a tool-integrated reasoning framework that enables structured problem solving by iteratively decomposing a given math problem (as an image) into natural language rationales and executable Python steps to determine the final answer. Second, we build a framework to measure and improve visual math reasoning: a LaTeX-based pipeline that converts chain-of-thought math corpora (e.g., NuminaMath) into challenging image counterparts, and a large set of synthetic tool-use trajectories derived from a real-world, homework-style image dataset (called SnapAsk) for fine-tuning VLMs. Our experiments show that tool-integrated supervision improves image-based reasoning, and OCR grounding can further narrow the gap for smaller models, although its benefit diminishes at scale. These findings highlight that modality gap severity inversely correlates with model size, and that structured reasoning and OCR-based grounding are complementary strategies for advancing visual mathematical reasoning.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Safety alignment incurs safety tax that perturbs a large reasoning model's (LRM) general reasoning ability. Existing datasets used for safety alignment for an LRM are usually constructed by distilling safety reasoning traces and answers from an external LRM or human labeler. However, such reasoning traces and answers exhibit a distributional gap with the target LRM that needs alignment, and we conjecture such distributional gap is the culprit leading to significant degradation of reasoning ability of the target LRM. Driven by this hypothesis, we propose a safety alignment dataset construction method, dubbed DGR. DGR transforms and refines an existing out-of-distributional safety reasoning dataset to be aligned with the target's LLM inner distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that i) DGR effectively mitigates the safety tax while maintaining safety performance across all baselines, i.e., achieving +30.2\% on DirectRefusal and +21.2\% on R1-ACT improvement in average reasoning accuracy compared to Vanilla SFT; ii) the degree of reasoning degradation correlates with the extent of distribution shift, suggesting that bridging this gap is central to preserving capabilities. Furthermore, we find that safety alignment in LRMs may primarily function as a mechanism to activate latent knowledge, as a mere 10 samples are sufficient for activating effective refusal behaviors. These findings not only emphasize the importance of distributional consistency but also provide insights into the activation mechanism of safety in reasoning models.

A benchmark score means nothing without knowing what a trivial method achieves and what the best possible method could achieve. We construct both bounds for a task with a rare kind of ground truth: predicting which sentences a crowd of readers -- highlighting for their own purposes, unpaid, uninstructed, and blind to each other -- marked in 120 web documents. The floor is naive truncation (lead); the ceiling is a split-half oracle: half the crowd predicting the other half. The gap between them is +0.2028 AP [+0.1698, +0.2342, domain-clustered], and three findings structure it. First, the gap is semantic: position and length features recover 5% of it. Second, frontier language models reach 35-53% of it zero-shot -- far above classical baselines, far below the crowd; a state-of-the-art prompt compressor (LLMLingua-2) lands below the floor, indistinguishable from random selection. Third, an unweighted cross-vendor fusion of five frontier rankings plus a position prior reaches 60%, beating the best single model by +0.0159 [+0.0044, +0.0269; Holm p=0.019] -- a gain that survives ablation of its best member, split-half arm selection, prompt paraphrase, and label, gate, and seed perturbations, and was CONFIRMED by a pre-registered replication on 217 independent documents (+0.0179, Holm p=0.042). Finally, the bracket compresses: distilling the fusion into one open-weight 8B student that reads the whole document retains 90% of the fusion's edge and reaches statistical parity with the strongest single frontier model (+0.0070 [-0.0068, +0.0200]), where a local-context student retains only 63% -- the crowd's signal lives in document-level structure, and the cheapest known improvement is to ask several different models and average.

We investigate the ability of language models to perform compositional reasoning tasks where the overall solution depends on correctly composing the answers to sub-problems. We measure how often models can correctly answer all sub-problems but not generate the overall solution, a ratio we call the compositionality gap. We evaluate this ratio by asking multi-hop questions with answers that require composing multiple facts unlikely to have been observed together during pretraining. In the GPT-3 family of models, as model size increases we show that the single-hop question answering performance improves faster than the multi-hop performance does, therefore the compositionality gap does not decrease. This surprising result suggests that while more powerful models memorize and recall more factual knowledge, they show no corresponding improvement in their ability to perform this kind of compositional reasoning. We then demonstrate how elicitive prompting (such as chain of thought) narrows the compositionality gap by reasoning explicitly instead of implicitly. We present a new method, self-ask, that further improves on chain of thought. In our method, the model explicitly asks itself (and then answers) follow-up questions before answering the initial question. We finally show that self-ask's structured prompting lets us easily plug in a search engine to answer the follow-up questions, which additionally improves accuracy.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

As large language model (LLM) agents evolve from isolated tool users into coordinated teams, reinforcement learning (RL) must optimize not only individual actions but also how work is spawned, delegated, communicated, aggregated, and stopped. This paper studies RL for LLM-based multi-agent systems through orchestration traces: temporal interaction graphs whose events include sub-agent spawning, delegation, communication, tool use, return, aggregation, and stopping decisions. Using this lens, we identify three technical axes. First, reward design spans eight families, including orchestration rewards for parallelism speedup, split correctness, and aggregation quality. Second, reward and credit signals attach to eight credit- or signal-bearing units from token to team; explicit counterfactual message-level credit remains especially sparse in our curated pool. Third, orchestration learning decomposes into five sub-decisions: when to spawn, whom to delegate to, how to communicate, how to aggregate, and when to stop. In our curated pool as of May 4, 2026, we found no explicit RL training method for the stopping decision. We connect academic methods to public industrial evidence from Kimi Agent Swarm, OpenAI Codex, and Anthropic Claude Code. The resulting scale gap is a gap between publicly reported deployment envelopes and open academic evaluation regimes, not independent verification of industrial training traces. We release the artifact at https://github.com/xxzcc/awesome-llm-mas-rl, including an 84-entry tagged paper pool, a 32-record exclusion log, scripted corpus statistics, and a minimal JSON schema for replayable orchestration traces.

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.

We study the depth of grade-school math (GSM) problem-solving capabilities of LLMs. To this end, we evaluate their performance on pairs of existing math word problems together so that the answer to the second problem depends on correctly answering the first problem. Our findings reveal a significant reasoning gap in most LLMs, that is performance difference between solving the compositional pairs and solving each question independently. This gap is more pronounced in smaller, more cost-efficient, and math-specialized models. Moreover, instruction-tuning recipes and code generation have varying effects across LLM sizes, while finetuning on GSM can lead to task overfitting. Our analysis indicates that large reasoning gaps are not because of test-set leakage, but due to distraction from additional context and poor second-hop reasoning. Overall, LLMs exhibit systematic differences in their reasoning abilities, despite what their performance on standard benchmarks indicates.

We present a fine-grained theoretical analysis of the performance gap between reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) and direct preference optimization (DPO) under a representation gap. Our study decomposes this gap into two sources: an explicit representation gap under exact optimization and an implicit representation gap under finite samples. In the exact optimization setting, we characterize how the relative capacities of the reward and policy model classes influence the final policy qualities. We show that RLHF, DPO, or online DPO can outperform one another depending on the type of model mis-specifications. Notably, online DPO can outperform both RLHF and standard DPO when the reward and policy model classes are isomorphic and both mis-specified. In the approximate optimization setting, we provide a concrete construction where the ground-truth reward is implicitly sparse and show that RLHF requires significantly fewer samples than DPO to recover an effective reward model -- highlighting a statistical advantage of two-stage learning. Together, these results provide a comprehensive understanding of the performance gap between RLHF and DPO under various settings, and offer practical insights into when each method is preferred.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Clinical protocol-execution tasks -- checking a lab value, applying a threshold, placing a correctly structured FHIR order -- are natural candidates for RL from world feedback: once clinical SMEs encode decision logic into a verifier, that verifier grades unlimited rollouts without per-episode annotation. But applying RL requires a sound feedback channel and sufficient base capability. We audit MedAgentBench v1/v2, find a 41.7\% silent-finish ceiling that makes inaction the RL dominant strategy, and construct MedAgentBench-v3 (MAB-v3) (508 tasks, 8.9\% ceiling). Training Qwen3-8B exposes two structural barriers: a capability ceiling (10/20 task types have 0\% base performance, zero gradient) and a format-knowledge barrier (3/20 types require exact clinical codes undiscoverable by exploration). Pure RL reaches 18.2\% pass@1 vs.\ 34.1\% for rule-based SFT; the 15.9~pp gap is attributable entirely to these barriers. A decision/format-knowledge/lookup taxonomy predicts RL learnability and prescribes the fix: SFT to inject codes, RL to learn conditionals.

Eliciting feedback from end users of NLP models can be beneficial for improving models. However, how should we present model responses to users so they are most amenable to be corrected from user feedback? Further, what properties do users value to understand and trust responses? We answer these questions by analyzing the effect of rationales (or explanations) generated by QA models to support their answers. We specifically consider decomposed QA models that first extract an intermediate rationale based on a context and a question and then use solely this rationale to answer the question. A rationale outlines the approach followed by the model to answer the question. Our work considers various formats of these rationales that vary according to well-defined properties of interest. We sample rationales from language models using few-shot prompting for two datasets, and then perform two user studies. First, we present users with incorrect answers and corresponding rationales in various formats and ask them to provide natural language feedback to revise the rationale. We then measure the effectiveness of this feedback in patching these rationales through in-context learning. The second study evaluates how well different rationale formats enable users to understand and trust model answers, when they are correct. We find that rationale formats significantly affect how easy it is (1) for users to give feedback for rationales, and (2) for models to subsequently execute this feedback. In addition, formats with attributions to the context and in-depth reasoning significantly enhance user-reported understanding and trust of model outputs.

Although modern neural networks often generalize to new combinations of familiar concepts, the conditions that enable such compositionality have long been an open question. In this work, we study the systematicity gap in visual question answering: the performance difference between reasoning on previously seen and unseen combinations of object attributes. To test, we introduce a novel diagnostic dataset, CLEVR-HOPE. We find that the systematicity gap is not reduced by increasing the quantity of training data, but is reduced by increasing the diversity of training data. In particular, our experiments suggest that the more distinct attribute type combinations are seen during training, the more systematic we can expect the resulting model to be.

Diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating high-quality samples and enhancing performance across diverse domains through Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG). However, the quality of generated samples is highly sensitive to the selection of the guidance weight. In this work, we identify a critical ``training-inference gap'' and we argue that it is the presence of this gap that undermines the performance of conditional generation and renders outputs highly sensitive to the guidance weight. We quantify this gap by measuring the accumulated error during the inference stage and establish a correlation between the selection of guidance weight and minimizing this gap. Furthermore, to mitigate this gap, we propose DiffIER, an optimization-based method for high-quality generation. We demonstrate that the accumulated error can be effectively reduced by an iterative error minimization at each step during inference. By introducing this novel plug-and-play optimization framework, we enable the optimization of errors at every single inference step and enhance generation quality. Empirical results demonstrate that our proposed method outperforms baseline approaches in conditional generation tasks. Furthermore, the method achieves consistent success in text-to-image generation, image super-resolution, and text-to-speech generation, underscoring its versatility and potential for broad applications in future research.

Discovering causal regularities and applying them to build functional systems--the discovery-to-application loop--is a hallmark of general intelligence, yet evaluating this capacity has been hindered by the vast complexity gap between scientific discovery and real-world engineering. We introduce SciCrafter, a Minecraft-based benchmark that operationalizes this loop through parameterized redstone circuit tasks. Agents must ignite lamps in specified patterns (e.g., simultaneously or in timed sequences); scaling target parameters substantially increases construction complexity and required knowledge, forcing genuine discovery rather than reliance on memorized solutions. Evaluating frontier models including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, and Claude-Opus-4.5 under a general-purpose code agent scaffold, we find that all plateau at approximately 26% success rate. To diagnose these failures, we decompose the loop into four capacities--knowledge gap identification, experimental discovery, knowledge consolidation, and knowledge application--and design targeted interventions whose marginal contributions serve as proxies for corresponding gaps. Our analysis reveals that although the general knowledge application capability still remains as the biggest gap across all models, for frontier models the knowledge gap identification starts to become a major hurdle--indicating the bottleneck is shifting from solving problems right to raising the right problems for current AI. We release SciCrafter as a diagnostic probe for future research on AI systems that navigate the full discovery-to-application loop.

Large language models (LMs) are capable of generating free-text rationales to aid question answering. However, prior work 1) suggests that useful self-rationalization is emergent only at significant scales (e.g., 175B parameter GPT-3); and 2) focuses largely on downstream performance, ignoring the semantics of the rationales themselves, e.g., are they faithful, true, and helpful for humans? In this work, we enable small-scale LMs (approx. 200x smaller than GPT-3) to generate rationales that not only improve downstream task performance, but are also more plausible, consistent, and diverse, assessed both by automatic and human evaluation. Our method, MaRio (Multi-rewArd RatIOnalization), is a multi-reward conditioned self-rationalization algorithm that optimizes multiple distinct properties like plausibility, diversity and consistency. Results on five difficult question-answering datasets StrategyQA, QuaRel, OpenBookQA, NumerSense and QASC show that not only does MaRio improve task accuracy, but it also improves the self-rationalization quality of small LMs across the aforementioned axes better than a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) baseline. Extensive human evaluations confirm that MaRio rationales are preferred vs. SFT rationales, as well as qualitative improvements in plausibility and consistency.

Large language models (LLMs) excel in complex reasoning tasks, and distilling their reasoning capabilities into smaller models has shown promise. However, we uncover an interesting phenomenon, which we term the Small Model Learnability Gap: small models (leq3B parameters) do not consistently benefit from long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning or distillation from larger models. Instead, they perform better when fine-tuned on shorter, simpler reasoning chains that better align with their intrinsic learning capacity. To address this, we propose Mix Distillation, a simple yet effective strategy that balances reasoning complexity by combining long and short CoT examples or reasoning from both larger and smaller models. Our experiments demonstrate that Mix Distillation significantly improves small model reasoning performance compared to training on either data alone. These findings highlight the limitations of direct strong model distillation and underscore the importance of adapting reasoning complexity for effective reasoning capability transfer.

Neural language models (LMs) have achieved impressive results on various language-based reasoning tasks by utilizing latent knowledge encoded in their own pretrained parameters. To make this reasoning process more explicit, recent works retrieve a rationalizing LM's internal knowledge by training or prompting it to generate free-text rationales, which can be used to guide task predictions made by either the same LM or a separate reasoning LM. However, rationalizing LMs require expensive rationale annotation and/or computation, without any assurance that their generated rationales improve LM task performance or faithfully reflect LM decision-making. In this paper, we propose PINTO, an LM pipeline that rationalizes via prompt-based learning, and learns to faithfully reason over rationales via counterfactual regularization. First, PINTO maps out a suitable reasoning process for the task input by prompting a frozen rationalizing LM to generate a free-text rationale. Second, PINTO's reasoning LM is fine-tuned to solve the task using the generated rationale as context, while regularized to output less confident predictions when the rationale is perturbed. Across four datasets, we show that PINTO significantly improves the generalization ability of the reasoning LM, yielding higher performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution test sets. Also, we find that PINTO's rationales are more faithful to its task predictions than those generated by competitive baselines.

Almost every large language model that reaches a broad audience is quantized: trained in full precision, then compressed for efficiency. This step is assumed harmless and its safety is rarely re-checked. We find its principal side effect is increased bias that standard safety evaluation misses. Holding the model, its training, and the prompts fixed, a quantized model still refuses harmful requests, still avoids over-refusing benign prompts, and still selects the unbiased multiple-choice answer. Yet asked an open-ended question, the same model volunteers stereotypes in all eight languages we probe, in roughly one in four open-ended answers under an independent judge (~24% to ~27% across the compression ladder): it passes every standard check and still reaches users measurably more biased. The selective gap is a robust finding; whether open-ended bias further increases with compression is less certain, sensitive to the judge that scores it. We address both with QuantiBias, a benchmark that pairs a generative, multilingual stereotype probe with the refusal and multiple-choice controls that isolate open-ended generation, contrasts each build with and without reasoning, and rates the content severity of what it generates. Across two backbone models (Qwen and Gemma), a five-family screen, and eight benchmarks, quantizers allocate their extra precision by capability data that carries no bias-prevention signal, and reasoning before answering roughly halves the effect on some families while doing nothing on others. A quantized build must be re-evaluated for open-ended bias, not only on the short-form safeguards it already passes.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

With the rapid development of large language models (LLMs), generative reward models (GRMs) have been widely adopted for reward modeling and evaluation. Previous studies have primarily focused on training specialized GRMs by optimizing them on preference datasets with the judgment correctness as supervision. While it's widely accepted that GRMs with stronger problem-solving capabilities typically exhibit superior judgment abilities, we first identify a significant solve-to-judge gap when examining individual queries. Specifically, the solve-to-judge gap refers to the phenomenon where GRMs struggle to make correct judgments on some queries (14%-37%), despite being fully capable of solving them. In this paper, we propose the Solve-to-Judge (S2J) approach to address this problem. Specifically, S2J simultaneously leverages both the solving and judging capabilities on a single GRM's output for supervision, explicitly linking the GRM's problem-solving and evaluation abilities during model optimization, thereby narrowing the gap. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that S2J effectively reduces the solve-to-judge gap by 16.2%, thereby enhancing the model's judgment performance by 5.8%. Notably, S2J achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance among GRMs built on the same base model while utilizing a significantly smaller training dataset. Moreover, S2J accomplishes this through self-evolution without relying on more powerful external models for distillation.

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

Data-centric curation pipelines frequently rely on model confidence scores to flag and filter noisy or mislabeled training instances. Evaluating this filtering convention on a large-scale consumer lending sample (LendingClub, N = 1,344,936) uncovers an underlying demographic asymmetry: high-income defaulters are disproportionately classified as label noise relative to low-income defaulters (Cramer's V approximately 0.03-0.07). Re-examining this behavior through the lens of equal opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016] reveals a far more severe discrepancy: a 16.86 percentage point gap in true positive rate (recall) between high- and low-income borrowers who ultimately defaulted. Implementing a sequential feature-blinding methodology allows us to isolate the drivers of this disparity across three distinct mechanisms: (1) direct reliance on self-reported applicant income; (2) algorithmic absorption of upstream institutional bias encoded within origination interest rates; and (3) a residual disparity (3.55 percentage points in cross-validation; 2.56 percentage points on a held-out test partition, Z = -4.04, p < 0.0001) that remains even after purging both income and interest rates from the model. Out-of-sample signed SHAP valuations demonstrate that this residual gap is maintained by structural proxies, most notably loan amount and home ownership status. These empirical findings show that simply blinding an algorithm to sensitive attributes fails to ensure fairness when institutional pricing decisions and behavioral proxy variables collectively reconstruct the omitted signals. We outline the practical implications of these findings for auditing data-centric AI workflows within regulated financial institutions.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

Free-text rationales justify model decisions in natural language and thus become likable and accessible among approaches to explanation across many tasks. However, their effectiveness can be hindered by misinterpretation and hallucination. As a perturbation test, we investigate how large language models (LLMs) perform rationale generation under the effects of readability level control, i.e., being prompted for an explanation targeting a specific expertise level, such as sixth grade or college. We find that explanations are adaptable to such instruction, though the requested readability is often misaligned with the measured text complexity according to traditional readability metrics. Furthermore, the generated rationales tend to feature medium level complexity, which correlates with the measured quality using automatic metrics. Finally, our human annotators confirm a generally satisfactory impression on rationales at all readability levels, with high-school-level readability being most commonly perceived and favored.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

Interpretability or explainability is an emerging research field in NLP. From a user-centric point of view, the goal is to build models that provide proper justification for their decisions, similar to those of humans, by requiring the models to satisfy additional constraints. To this end, we introduce a new application on legal text where, contrary to mainstream literature targeting word-level rationales, we conceive rationales as selected paragraphs in multi-paragraph structured court cases. We also release a new dataset comprising European Court of Human Rights cases, including annotations for paragraph-level rationales. We use this dataset to study the effect of already proposed rationale constraints, i.e., sparsity, continuity, and comprehensiveness, formulated as regularizers. Our findings indicate that some of these constraints are not beneficial in paragraph-level rationale extraction, while others need re-formulation to better handle the multi-label nature of the task we consider. We also introduce a new constraint, singularity, which further improves the quality of rationales, even compared with noisy rationale supervision. Experimental results indicate that the newly introduced task is very challenging and there is a large scope for further research.

Recent advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly through Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), have significantly enhanced their reasoning abilities. However, a critical gap persists: these models struggle with dynamic spatial interactions, a capability essential for real-world applications. To bridge this gap, we introduce M2-Reasoning-7B, a model designed to excel in both general and spatial reasoning. Our approach integrates two key innovations: (1) a novel data pipeline that generates 294.2K high-quality data samples (168K for cold-start fine-tuning and 126.2K for RLVR), which feature logically coherent reasoning trajectories and have undergone comprehensive assessment; and (2) a dynamic multi-task training strategy with step-wise optimization to mitigate conflicts between data, and task-specific rewards for delivering tailored incentive signals. This combination of curated data and advanced training allows M2-Reasoning-7B to set a new state-of-the-art (SOTA) across 8 benchmarks, showcasing superior performance in both general and spatial reasoning domains.

A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it. This rests on a hidden premise -- that the direction which detects a behavior and the direction which controls it are the same, or close. We test this geometrically: what is the angle between the direction that best detects a behavior and the one that best causes it? If detection implies control the cosine is near 1; otherwise it quantifies a detection-intervention gap. On Gemma 2-2B-it, output format (clean JSON vs markdown fencing) collapses both roles onto one axis. Hallucination does not: the model detects fake entities with perfect linear separability (AUC = 1.000 from layer 5), yet that direction sits at cos = 0.12 (about 83 degrees) from the direction producing a refusal -- a small, reproducible alignment, far from the cos = 1 that "detection is control" would require. A detector built from activations, with no chosen tokens, likewise fails to align (cos = -0.06). The gap generalizes: across four models from three families and two scales (1B-9B), cos stays in [0.12, 0.20], identical before and after instruction tuning (0.1197 vs 0.1200), placing its origin in pretraining. A 15-degree rotation toward the refusal direction partially bridges it -- 73% and 60% refusal on two held-out fake-entity categories at 1.8% false positives. We then ask whether this cosine predicts steerability, and it does not: detection is a high-dimensional class, not a single direction, and what separates the steerable case is functional, not readable from a static angle. The cosine is a weight-computable signature of the dissociation between knowing and steering, not a predictor of it.

Current benchmarks for AI clinician systems, often based on multiple-choice exams or manual rubrics, fail to capture the depth, robustness, and safety required for real-world clinical practice. To address this, we introduce the GAPS framework, a multidimensional paradigm for evaluating Grounding (cognitive depth), Adequacy (answer completeness), Perturbation (robustness), and Safety. Critically, we developed a fully automated, guideline-anchored pipeline to construct a GAPS-aligned benchmark end-to-end, overcoming the scalability and subjectivity limitations of prior work. Our pipeline assembles an evidence neighborhood, creates dual graph and tree representations, and automatically generates questions across G-levels. Rubrics are synthesized by a DeepResearch agent that mimics GRADE-consistent, PICO-driven evidence review in a ReAct loop. Scoring is performed by an ensemble of large language model (LLM) judges. Validation confirmed our automated questions are high-quality and align with clinician judgment. Evaluating state-of-the-art models on the benchmark revealed key failure modes: performance degrades sharply with increased reasoning depth (G-axis), models struggle with answer completeness (A-axis), and they are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations (P-axis) as well as certain safety issues (S-axis). This automated, clinically-grounded approach provides a reproducible and scalable method for rigorously evaluating AI clinician systems and guiding their development toward safer, more reliable clinical practice.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

The class of direct preference optimization (DPO) algorithms has emerged as a promising approach for solving the alignment problem in foundation models. These algorithms work with very limited feedback in the form of pairwise preferences and fine-tune models to align with these preferences without explicitly learning a reward model. While the form of feedback used by these algorithms makes the data collection process easy and relatively more accurate, its ambiguity in terms of the quality of responses could have negative implications. For example, it is not clear if a decrease (increase) in the likelihood of preferred (dispreferred) responses during the execution of these algorithms could be interpreted as a positive or negative phenomenon. In this paper, we study how to design algorithms that can leverage additional information in the form of rating gap, which informs the learner how much the chosen response is better than the rejected one. We present new algorithms that can achieve faster statistical rates than DPO in presence of accurate rating gap information. Moreover, we theoretically prove and empirically show that the performance of our algorithms is robust to inaccuracy in rating gaps. Finally, we demonstrate the solid performance of our methods in comparison to a number of DPO-style algorithms across a wide range of LLMs and evaluation benchmarks.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used to make decisions from visual inputs. We introduce FAIRLENS, a benchmark and evaluation framework for measuring both the fairness and the validity of VLM responses in three high-stakes domains: hiring, legal, and healthcare. FAIRLENS pairs real face images spanning gender, race, and age groups with closed- and open-ended questions, giving more than 100K image-question pairs per model, and evaluates responses from four complementary views: demographic parity over adverse outcome rates, soundness, demographic association over unsupported roles and statuses, and bias in free-text generation. Soundness is the central validity criterion: a response is sound when it follows the evidence stated in the question and abstains when the image cannot support an answer. Evaluating eight VLMs, we find that the primary failure is unwarranted inference rather than unequal treatment. Models routinely infer qualifications, threat, illness, or professional role from a face instead of abstaining, and the weakest model does so on 99% of the questions its input cannot answer. These failures are most severe in legal and healthcare, where recognizing insufficient evidence matters most, and disparity metrics alone would miss them: parity gaps are small in absolute terms, yet when baseline adverse rates are low the same gap means one demographic group receives adverse labels several times as often as another, and a small gap can equally reflect a model that treats every group unsafely. Bias in free-text responses is only loosely coupled to multiple-choice accuracy, so correct structured answers do not imply safe generation. FAIRLENS shows that fair high-stakes VLM behavior requires similar treatment across groups and refusal to infer high-stakes attributes from appearance, and its question suite transfers to any face corpus with demographic annotations.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) faces considerable challenges concerning resource constraints and inference efficiency. Recent research has increasingly focused on smaller, task-specific models enhanced by distilling knowledge from LLMs. However, prior studies have often overlooked the diversity and quality of knowledge, especially the untapped potential of negative knowledge. Constructing effective negative knowledge remains severely understudied. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework called quality-guided contrastive rationale distillation aimed at enhancing reasoning capabilities through contrastive knowledge learning. For positive knowledge, we enrich its diversity through temperature sampling and employ self-consistency for further denoising and refinement. For negative knowledge, we propose an innovative self-adversarial approach that generates low-quality rationales by sampling previous iterations of smaller language models, embracing the idea that one can learn from one's own weaknesses. A contrastive loss is developed to distill both positive and negative knowledge into smaller language models, where an online-updating discriminator is integrated to assess qualities of rationales and assign them appropriate weights, optimizing the training process. Through extensive experiments across multiple reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms existing distillation techniques, yielding higher-quality rationales.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has demonstrated remarkable effectiveness in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. Many existing alignment approaches rely on the Bradley-Terry (BT) model assumption, which assumes the existence of a ground-truth reward for each prompt-response pair. However, this assumption can be overly restrictive when modeling complex human preferences. In this paper, we drop the BT model assumption and study LLM alignment under general preferences, formulated as a two-player game. Drawing on theoretical insights from learning in games, we integrate optimistic online mirror descent into our alignment framework to approximate the Nash policy. Theoretically, we demonstrate that our approach achieves an O(T^{-1}) bound on the duality gap, improving upon the previous O(T^{-1/2}) result. More importantly, we implement our method and show through experiments that it outperforms state-of-the-art RLHF algorithms across multiple representative benchmarks.

The advent of Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) signals a paradigm shift in artificial intelligence, moving from passive perception to active, cross-modal generation. Despite their unprecedented ability to synthesize information, a critical gap persists in evaluation: existing benchmarks primarily assess discriminative understanding or unconstrained image generation separately, failing to measure the integrated cognitive process of generative reasoning. To bridge this gap, we propose that geometric construction provides an ideal testbed as it inherently demands a fusion of language comprehension and precise visual generation. We introduce GGBench, a benchmark designed specifically to evaluate geometric generative reasoning. It provides a comprehensive framework for systematically diagnosing a model's ability to not only understand and reason but to actively construct a solution, thereby setting a more rigorous standard for the next generation of intelligent systems. Project website: https://opendatalab-raiser.github.io/GGBench/.

Whether large language models can be prompted to generate rhetorical fallacies on demand, and whether current safety post-training constrains this behavior, has received less attention than the related question of detecting fallacies in existing text. We close this gap with DeflectBench, evaluating 23,990 generations from four frontier models across three deflection strategies (whataboutism, ad hominem, red herring), seven prompt framings, and 80 claims spanning four controversy levels. Refusal is governed primarily by request structure rather than claim content. Per claim refusal varies by only 11 percentage points across the 80 claims, while a single prompt frame change can swing within model refusal by nearly 100 percentage points and switching the requested fallacy type can swing it by over 80 percentage points within explicit framings. An educational debate coach prompt framing collapses refusal to near zero across all four model families, but the bypassed behavior is not clean compliance. Models typically produce labeled compliance, naming the requested manipulation in the same response that contains it. The four models distribute differently across refusal, labeled compliance, soft refusal, and clean compliance. The code and dataset are released at https://github.com/ArtKanke/DeflectBench.

Recent domain generalization (DG) approaches typically use the hypothesis learned on source domains for inference on the unseen target domain. However, such a hypothesis can be arbitrarily far from the optimal one for the target domain, induced by a gap termed ``adaptivity gap''. Without exploiting the domain information from the unseen test samples, adaptivity gap estimation and minimization are intractable, which hinders us to robustify a model to any unknown distribution. In this paper, we first establish a generalization bound that explicitly considers the adaptivity gap. Our bound motivates two strategies to reduce the gap: the first one is ensembling multiple classifiers to enrich the hypothesis space, then we propose effective gap estimation methods for guiding the selection of a better hypothesis for the target. The other method is minimizing the gap directly by adapting model parameters using online target samples. We thus propose Domain-specific Risk Minimization (DRM). During training, DRM models the distributions of different source domains separately; for inference, DRM performs online model steering using the source hypothesis for each arriving target sample. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed DRM for domain generalization with the following advantages: 1) it significantly outperforms competitive baselines on different distributional shift settings; 2) it achieves either comparable or superior accuracies on all source domains compared to vanilla empirical risk minimization; 3) it remains simple and efficient during training, and 4) it is complementary to invariant learning approaches.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Cultural differences in common ground may result in pragmatic failure and misunderstandings during communication. We develop our method Rational Speech Acts for Cross-Cultural Communication (RSA+C3) to resolve cross-cultural differences in common ground. To measure the success of our method, we study RSA+C3 in the collaborative referential game of Codenames Duet and show that our method successfully improves collaboration between simulated players of different cultures. Our contributions are threefold: (1) creating Codenames players using contrastive learning of an embedding space and LLM prompting that are aligned with human patterns of play, (2) studying culturally induced differences in common ground reflected in our trained models, and (3) demonstrating that our method RSA+C3 can ease cross-cultural communication in gameplay by inferring sociocultural context from interaction. Our code is publicly available at github.com/icwhite/codenames.

Explaining Artificial Intelligence (AI) decisions is a major challenge nowadays in AI, in particular when applied to sensitive scenarios like medicine and law. However, the need to explain the rationale behind decisions is a main issue also for human-based deliberation as it is important to justify why a certain decision has been taken. Resident medical doctors for instance are required not only to provide a (possibly correct) diagnosis, but also to explain how they reached a certain conclusion. Developing new tools to aid residents to train their explanation skills is therefore a central objective of AI in education. In this paper, we follow this direction, and we present, to the best of our knowledge, the first multilingual dataset for Medical Question Answering where correct and incorrect diagnoses for a clinical case are enriched with a natural language explanation written by doctors. These explanations have been manually annotated with argument components (i.e., premise, claim) and argument relations (i.e., attack, support), resulting in the Multilingual CasiMedicos-Arg dataset which consists of 558 clinical cases in four languages (English, Spanish, French, Italian) with explanations, where we annotated 5021 claims, 2313 premises, 2431 support relations, and 1106 attack relations. We conclude by showing how competitive baselines perform over this challenging dataset for the argument mining task.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

We propose a society-first theory of normative appropriateness where individuals, modeled as pre-trained actors with cognitive architectures analogous to Large Language Models (LLMs), generate behavior via predictive pattern completion. Our theory posits that individuals act by completing distributed symbolic patterns based on context, answering questions such as "What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this?". This sense-making mechanism provides a parsimonious account of the key features of human norms: their context-dependence, arbitrariness, automaticity, dynamism, and their support from social sanctioning. It challenges rational-choice theories of social norms by accounting for their key features without needing to exogenously posit scalar rewards or preference relations. By distinguishing between explicit norms, which we associate with in-context adaptation, and implicit norms, which we associate with long-term memory, the theory reconceptualizes several foundational ideas in cognitive science. In particular, it gives an alternative account to the data traditionally seen as supporting dual-process models, and it flips the role of rationality, allowing us to construe it as adherence to culturally-contingent justification standards.

Long-term memory systems store what a user says in an external store and retrieve it when a related query arrives. This interface rests on an assumption so natural that it is rarely stated: a memory that is needed will resemble the query that needs it. World knowledge breaks the assumption. A tree-nut allergy should change the answer to a macaron request through their almond-flour ingredient, yet the two texts share no cue a retriever can see. We call this failure mode the implicit-association blind spot and introduce InMind, a 125-task, expert-verified benchmark spanning ten life domains, with 113 tasks grounded in citable public sources. Its paired controls separate three explanations that existing evaluations conflate: the fact was never stored, the model lacks the bridging knowledge, or the fact was stored and never surfaced. The verdict is clean. With the decisive memory placed in context, the backbone answers 84.0 percent of indirect queries; when the same memory must be retrieved, six vector, graph, and agentic memory systems reach at most 14.4 percent, even though they recall the same facts on demand at up to 100 percent. An embedding with eight times the dimensionality raises answer-blind target recall for every system yet leaves the gap essentially intact. A minimal diagnostic probe that keeps memory visible before the query arrives recovers most of the gap, locating the failure in the query-conditioned interface itself and pointing to routing, deciding which facts must stay visible, as the open problem InMind is built to score.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Multicultural multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in globally diverse settings, where different agents are grounded in different cultural backgrounds. Existing cultural evaluation focuses on value alignment: how closely a single agent matches a target culture. Yet alignment is a per-agent property and cannot reveal whether a system, taken as a whole, preserves the cultural plurality it is meant to represent. We propose value diversity as a system-level evaluation axis for multicultural agent systems, defined through the dissimilarity between culturally conditioned agents' responses on a shared value survey. Using the World Values Survey, we evaluate 19 cultures and 18 backbone models across a wide range of system configurations. We find that diversity is largely uncorrelated with alignment, indicating that the two capture complementary system properties, and that current multicultural agent systems fall substantially below human societies in value diversity. Mixed-backbone systems narrow this gap but do not close it, and the gap persists across culture compositions and agent scales. Social interaction further erodes diversity by driving agents toward consensus, and a participatory budgeting case study shows that this homogenization narrows the breadth of collective decision-making. Together, our results establish value diversity as a distinct evaluation axis for multicultural multi-agent systems and reveal a persistent homogenization tendency in current LLM-based societies. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/iNLP-Lab/MultiAgent-Diversity.

We study linear contextual bandits in the misspecified setting, where the expected reward function can be approximated by a linear function class up to a bounded misspecification level zeta>0. We propose an algorithm based on a novel data selection scheme, which only selects the contextual vectors with large uncertainty for online regression. We show that, when the misspecification level zeta is dominated by tilde O (Delta / d) with Delta being the minimal sub-optimality gap and d being the dimension of the contextual vectors, our algorithm enjoys the same gap-dependent regret bound tilde O (d^2/Delta) as in the well-specified setting up to logarithmic factors. In addition, we show that an existing algorithm SupLinUCB (Chu et al., 2011) can also achieve a gap-dependent constant regret bound without the knowledge of sub-optimality gap Delta. Together with a lower bound adapted from Lattimore et al. (2020), our result suggests an interplay between misspecification level and the sub-optimality gap: (1) the linear contextual bandit model is efficiently learnable when zeta leq tilde O(Delta / d); and (2) it is not efficiently learnable when zeta geq tilde Omega({Delta} / {d}). Experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets corroborate our theoretical results.

Training models with robust group fairness properties is crucial in ethically sensitive application areas such as medical diagnosis. Despite the growing body of work aiming to minimise demographic bias in AI, this problem remains challenging. A key reason for this challenge is the fairness generalisation gap: High-capacity deep learning models can fit all training data nearly perfectly, and thus also exhibit perfect fairness during training. In this case, bias emerges only during testing when generalisation performance differs across subgroups. This motivates us to take a bi-level optimisation perspective on fair learning: Optimising the learning strategy based on validation fairness. Specifically, we consider the highly effective workflow of adapting pre-trained models to downstream medical imaging tasks using parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) techniques. There is a trade-off between updating more parameters, enabling a better fit to the task of interest vs. fewer parameters, potentially reducing the generalisation gap. To manage this tradeoff, we propose FairTune, a framework to optimise the choice of PEFT parameters with respect to fairness. We demonstrate empirically that FairTune leads to improved fairness on a range of medical imaging datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/Raman1121/FairTune

Scaling high-quality tutoring remains a major challenge in education. Due to growing demand, many platforms employ novice tutors who, unlike experienced educators, struggle to address student mistakes and thus fail to seize prime learning opportunities. Our work explores the potential of large language models (LLMs) to close the novice-expert knowledge gap in remediating math mistakes. We contribute Bridge, a method that uses cognitive task analysis to translate an expert's latent thought process into a decision-making model for remediation. This involves an expert identifying (A) the student's error, (B) a remediation strategy, and (C) their intention before generating a response. We construct a dataset of 700 real tutoring conversations, annotated by experts with their decisions. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on our dataset and find that the expert's decision-making model is critical for LLMs to close the gap: responses from GPT4 with expert decisions (e.g., "simplify the problem") are +76% more preferred than without. Additionally, context-sensitive decisions are critical to closing pedagogical gaps: random decisions decrease GPT4's response quality by -97% than expert decisions. Our work shows the potential of embedding expert thought processes in LLM generations to enhance their capability to bridge novice-expert knowledge gaps. Our dataset and code can be found at: https://github.com/rosewang2008/bridge.

The development of large language models has instilled widespread interest among the researchers to understand their inherent reasoning and problem-solving capabilities. Despite good amount of research going on to elucidate these capabilities, there is a still an appreciable gap in understanding moral development and judgments of these models. The current approaches of evaluating the ethical reasoning abilities of these models as a classification task pose numerous inaccuracies because of over-simplification. In this study, we built a psychological connection by bridging two disparate fields-human psychology and AI. We proposed an effective evaluation framework which can help to delineate the model's ethical reasoning ability in terms of moral consistency and Kohlberg's moral development stages with the help of Psychometric Assessment Tool-Defining Issues Test.

The global economy is entering the era of Agentic Commerce, where autonomous agents can discover services, negotiate prices, and transact value. However adoption towards agentic commerce faces a foundational trust gap: current systems are built for direct human interactions rather than agent-driven operations. It lacks core primitives across three critical stages of agentic transactions. First, Task Delegation lacks means to translate user intent into defined scopes, discover appropriate agents, and securely authorize actions. Second, Payment Settlement for tasks is processed before execution, lacking verifiable evidence to validate the agent's work. Third, Audit Mechanisms fail to capture the full transaction lifecycle, preventing clear accountability for disputes. While emerging standards address fragments of this trust gap, there still remains a critical need for a unified infrastructure that binds the entire transaction lifecycle. To resolve this gap, we introduce TessPay, a unified infrastructure that replaces implicit trust with a 'Verify-then-Pay' architecture. It is a two plane architecture separating control and verification from settlement. TessPay operationalizes trust across four distinct stages: Before execution, agents are anchored in a canonical registry and user intent is captured as verifiable mandates, enabling stakeholder accountability. During execution, funds are locked in escrow while the agent executes the task and generates cryptographic evidence (TLS Notary, TEE etc.) to support Proof of Task Execution (PoTE). At settlement, the system verifies this evidence and releases funds only when the PoTE satisfies verification predicates; modular rail adapters ensure this PoTE-gated escrow remains chain-agnostic across heterogeneous payment rails. After settlement, TessPay preserves a tamper-evident audit trail to enable clear accountability for dispute resolution.

Text-to-image generation has advanced rapidly with diffusion models, progressing from CLIP and T5 conditioning to unified systems where a single LLM backbone handles both visual understanding and generation. Despite the architectural unification, these systems frequently fail to faithfully align complex prompts during synthesis, even though they remain highly accurate at verifying whether an image satisfies those same prompts. We formalize this as the understanding-generation gap and propose UniReasoner, a framework that leverages the LLM as a universal reasoner to convert its understanding strength into direct generation guidance. Given a prompt, the LLM first produces a coarse visual draft composed of discrete vision tokens. It then performs a self-critique by evaluating the draft for prompt consistency, producing a grounded textual evaluation that pinpoints what needs to be corrected. Finally, a diffusion model is conditioned jointly on the prompt, the visual draft, and the evaluation, ensuring that generation is guided by explicit corrective signals. Each signal addresses a limitation of the other: the draft provides a concrete, scene-level anchor that reduces under-specification in text-only conditioning, while the evaluation turns verification into grounded, actionable constraints that correct omissions, hallucinations, and relational errors. Experiments show that UniReasoner improves compositional alignment and semantic faithfulness under the same diffusion backbone while maintaining image quality, demonstrating a practical way to exploit LLM reasoning to close the understanding-generation gap.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) aim to solve diverse and complex problems through structured reasoning. Recent advances in group-based policy optimization methods have shown promise in enabling stable advantage estimation without reliance on process-level annotations. However, these methods rely on advantage gaps induced by high-quality samples within the same batch, which makes the training process fragile and inefficient when intra-group advantages collapse under challenging tasks. To address these problems, we propose a reinforcement learning mechanism named \textbf{R^3} that along three directions: (1) a cross-context \underline{\textbf{R}eplay} strategy that maintains the intra-group advantage by recalling valuable examples from historical trajectories of the same query, (2) an in-context self-\underline{\textbf{R}eflection} mechanism enabling models to refine outputs by leveraging past failures, and (3) a structural entropy \underline{\textbf{R}anking reward}, which assigns relative rewards to truncated or failed samples by ranking responses based on token-level entropy patterns, capturing both local exploration and global stability. We implement our method on Deepseek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B and train it on the DeepscaleR-40k in the math domain. Experiments demonstrate our method achieves SoTA performance on several math benchmarks, representing significant improvements and fewer reasoning tokens over the base models. Code and model will be released.

Solving algebraic word problems requires executing a series of arithmetic operations---a program---to obtain a final answer. However, since programs can be arbitrarily complicated, inducing them directly from question-answer pairs is a formidable challenge. To make this task more feasible, we solve these problems by generating answer rationales, sequences of natural language and human-readable mathematical expressions that derive the final answer through a series of small steps. Although rationales do not explicitly specify programs, they provide a scaffolding for their structure via intermediate milestones. To evaluate our approach, we have created a new 100,000-sample dataset of questions, answers and rationales. Experimental results show that indirect supervision of program learning via answer rationales is a promising strategy for inducing arithmetic programs.

We present a simple method that achieves unexpectedly superior performance for Complex Reasoning involved Visual Question Answering. Our solution collects statistical features from high-frequency words of all the questions asked about an image and use them as accurate knowledge for answering further questions of the same image. We are fully aware that this setting is not ubiquitously applicable, and in a more common setting one should assume the questions are asked separately and they cannot be gathered to obtain a knowledge base. Nonetheless, we use this method as an evidence to demonstrate our observation that the bottleneck effect is more severe on the feature extraction part than it is on the knowledge reasoning part. We show significant gaps when using the same reasoning model with 1) ground-truth features; 2) statistical features; 3) detected features from completely learned detectors, and analyze what these gaps mean to researches on visual reasoning topics. Our model with the statistical features achieves the 2nd place in the GQA Challenge 2019.